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ANCHORAGE FLIGHT STANDARDS DISTRICT OFFICE ANNUAL INSPECTION AUTHORIZATION (IA) RENEWAL SEMINAR



Pictured from left to right (front): Don LeClair (ASI), Debbie Media (AST), Mike Legler (ASI), Sally Herzog (AST)
Pictured from left to right (back): Scott Norman (A/W Supervisor), Rudee Scott (ASI), Hugh McLaughlin (FSDO Manager), Craig Johnson (ASI), Ernie Walker (ASI).

The Anchorage Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) hosted its annual Inspection Authorization (IA) Renewal Seminar this year on March 4th at the Kincaid Park Bunker. Many employees from the Anchorage FSDO pulled together and invested a lot of time and effort into this year's seminar to ensure its success.

The all day event was attended by over 250 mechanics, pilots, and others in the aviation community. This annual event is a great opportunity for mechanics to renew their IA and this year 233 renewals were completed by the Anchorage FSDO at the seminar.

Hugh McLaughlin, manager of the Anchorage FSDO, opened the seminar with a reminder that aviation safety is a responsibility that everyone in the community shares. Presenters this year included Inspector Ernie Walker who went over current FAA maintenance issues, Inspector Don LeClair who spoke about FAR Part 135 Maintenance, Inspector Craig Johnson, who discussed the nuts and bolts of Field Approval, and Gary Bennett who talked about 406mhz ELTs. The Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) also sent speakers, and this year's seminar was a real success.

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We Can Do Better...We Have To
Kieran O'Farrell
Regional Safety Program Manager

I am a huge fan of a well-established program that has been a success for over 20 years, NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System, ASRS. It allows a pilot to file a report to NASA concerning an incident or occurrence involving a violation of 49 U.S.C Subtitle VII, or the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). The intent of this program is to gather candid information from pilots in an effort to address safety issues without fear of enforcement. This report is confidential with NASA, and filing the report is considered by the FAA to be indicative of a constructive attitude. Such an attitude is considered to prevent future violations, and thus, although a finding of a violation may be made, neither a civil penalty nor a certificate suspension will be imposed. Providing that:

1. The violation was inadvertent and not deliberate;
2. The violation did not involve a criminal offense, or an accident
3. The person has not been found in any prior FAA enforcement action.
4. The person proves that within 10 day after the violation, they completed and mailed a written ASRS report of the incident or occurrence to NASA.



(To download an ASRS form just go to: http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/forms/PDF_Files/general.pdf)

NASA publishes a flyer, *CALLBACK*, which highlights some of the situations that pilots have encountered so that we might all benefit from the lessons learned. I picked up the December issue and discovered that three of the seven occurrences in the issue came from Alaskan pilots. Undoubtedly they were all flying Part 135, and most probably had passengers (having passengers on board can be a very motivating reason to file a NASA report). The following are a couple excerpts from their reports:

Ø A pilot in a CE-207 was flying into a valley under a low overcast in deteriorating weather stated; *"I made the decision to turn around and head out of the pass...Due to rising terrain and lowering ceilings, I was now at 200-300 feet AGL. I was struggling to maintain control of the aircraft. My attention was being divided between looking outside and at the instrument panel. I was looking outside to maintain clearance from the terrain and try to navigate, but I was becoming very disorientated as the plane pitched and rolled and went in and out of the clouds. I had very few visual clues and the sloping terrain was making it very difficult to gain a horizon reference. Basically, I was looking outside to maintain terrain clearance and using the instruments to control the aircraft."*

Ø Another pilot flying a PA-32 stated; *"As I got to within five miles of the airport the weather deteriorated with visibility dropping to just over three miles...Within less than a minute, my windscreen went from clear to totally iced over from freezing rain. I was still able to maintain contact with the airport through my side windows and elected to land."*

Ø A CE-208 pilot made a decision to climb out of the weather before becoming a CFIT statistic. *"I departed for Nome. Departure weather was VMC. Nome had been IMC, although the weather was reported to be improving. About 30 DME from the Nome VOR, I began a decent from 4500 feet MSL in*

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(Continued from page 2)

an attempt to get under the weather. I stopped my decent at 500 MSL. Between 12-14 DME from the Nome VOR, I was scanning outside while attempting to keep ahead of my instrument scan. I made visual contact with the terrain. A glance at the radar altimeter indicated 300 feet AGL and decreasing. I immediately pitched the aircraft up, added full power, and executed a climbing 180-turn to 3500 feet.”

Now by no means am I judging here, whatever these pilots did to get out of the situation was the wise, exact right decision. Most of us have taken a flight or made decisions, mea culpa, myself included, that we would rather have been anywhere else at the time. Weather can change rapidly and granted, in one flight, a pilot can experience three separate weather systems, but what is true in those situations, as is holds true in the three above; our ‘luck bag’ was a little more empty, and our

‘experience bag’, a bit fuller. Another thing to consider here is, with the addition of advanced navigational equipment, like GPS and Capstone, equipment that gives pilots the potential to operate more safely than ever before, is how it is being used. For all the great benefits we reap from new technology, it is not installed with sound judgment or solid decision-making.

The ‘bush pilot syndrome’, simply does not serve us anymore. Our new heroes need to be the pilots that wait out the weather, or make the decision to turn around early enough in a flight, when it is still an option. While we are making excellent progress towards reducing our accident rate, we all have more work to do. Of course flying in Alaska has risk, but we need to look at the risk everyday, for every flight, evaluate it and manage it, so that you do not need ‘superior skill and daring’, to get you out of situations that ‘superior skill and daring’, got you into in the first place. We all can do better... we have to.

The job is not finished until the paperwork is done

Frank Crawford
Principal Maintenance Inspector

This old adage still applies today. After hours of hard work, paying attention to the smallest of detail, it is time to lay down the wrench and pick up your pen.

Remember that set of books that frustrated you so as you prepared for an annual and the additional time it took to complete the AD search. I’d bet you had some more thoughts about, “*I wish these entries told me more.*”

A major part of maintaining an aircraft is the upkeep of records. The “less is more” position I have witnessed too often leaves even the author of the entry unable to recall with sufficient detail the work accomplished even a short periods of time thereafter. Aircraft records that are not maintained to high standards actually devalue an aircraft and increase maintenance costs as well.



Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 91.417 outlines the standards for maintenance records and Advisory Circular 43.9C explains maintenance records in greater detail. An excerpt from paragraph 5.D concerning descriptions of work performed from the aforementioned AC reads “... *should be in sufficient detail to permit a person unfamiliar with the work to understand what was done...*”. As you make your entries, a full and descriptive record will insure not only yourself, but others as well will be able to know the full extent of the maintenance performed at the time and in the future.

CFI/DPE Initiative Kick-Off Meeting

Dennis Ward Medallion Foundation

In case you didn't know, the Alaskan Region CFI/DPE Initiative was introduced March 29th here in Anchorage. This initiative is a joint project between the Medallion Foundation and the Flight Standards Division of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and has been developing for about 8 months. The plan is to develop and implement appropriate intervention strategies through a partnership with Certified Flight Instructors (CFIs), Designated Pilot Examiners (DPEs) and other aviation stakeholders. The overall aim of the intervention strategies is to reduce general aviation accidents in our state.

We began this project by using portions of the TapRoot® analysis process to review landing accidents in Alaska over the last five years. The first analysis done was on accidents that involved either the failure to attain a suitable touch down spot or failure to compensate for wind, and the subsequent failure to execute a go-around when the touch down spot was missed or when the airplane was drifting or crabbing in windy conditions. We found that about 35 % of all general aviation accidents in Alaska over the last five years involved failure to execute a timely go-around.

The results of the analysis became the subject matter for the kick-off of the initiative at the CFI/DPE meeting held in Anchorage on March 29th. The purpose of the meeting was to introduce the program to our CFIs and DPEs and talk about reducing accidents. Approximately 50 CFIs and DPEs were in attendance. John Duncan, Alaskan Region Flight Standards Division Manager, started the meeting with some introductory remarks. Mr. Duncan told the audience that the FAA Alaskan Region was going to support this initiative and asked that the flight instructors do the same. Charlie Hamilton, the FAA Regional Coordinator for the initiative, provided the group with an overview and asked that the attendees consider developing an Anchorage area Flight Instructor Association, similar to the one in Fairbanks.

The first of the two keynote speakers was Francie Thomas. Francie is a long time flight instructor and pilot examiner from Fairbanks. She explained how the Interior of Alaska Flight Instructor Association was formed. She talked to the group about the organization's structure, accomplishments, and benefits. The presentation was well

received and several attendees indicated interest in developing a similar association in the Anchorage area.

The second speaker was Dennis Ward from the Medallion Foundation. Dennis' presentation addressed some of the findings of the accident analysis and the relationship between flight instructors, pilot examiners and the practical test standards (PTS). The presentation was focused on accidents where the pilot continued a landing approach while drifting, crabbing, or missing the spot, and, rather than go-around, crashed. In particular, the emphasis of this talk was about improving Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) by ensuring pilots know and use specific tolerances found in the landing and go around maneuvers in the private and commercial PTS. Dennis emphasized that if students are taught tolerances for landing, then they would know when a tolerance is exceeded. Therefore, we need to teach students that when the tolerance is exceeded, they are to make the decision to go-around. Sounds simple but results of the accident analysis indicate that certificated pilots are not making the decision to go-around when a tolerance is exceeded.

In closing, Dennis asked a thought provoking question. He asked the participants to consider if they emphasized that tolerances in the PTS apply equally during training **and** after certification. The failure to meet a tolerance on a check ride results in a pink slip. The failure to meet a tolerance after certification may result in a very big repair bill, or worse.



Local Pilot's Page

Runway pattern work in amphibis

Burke Mees
Alaska Airlines Pilot



In the course of a checkout in an amphibian, you'll spend some time staying in the pattern for the runway and at this point the question usually arises whether it is even worth the trouble to raise the gear. It seems like it would make sense to just leave the gear down to avoid the wear and inconvenience of long cycles, however I am a strong proponent of always bringing the gear up after every takeoff with no exceptions for the sake of habit. If this is firmly ingrained in your routine, you are less likely to find yourself with the gear down at an inappropriate time.

Learning to do good landings is only a small part of an amphib checkout; probably the more important goal of this flight training is to develop good habits that will help prevent a gear-related mishap down the road. One such habit is to consistently avoid having the gear extended at inappropriate times, such as the departure and climb. Even though you are planning an immediate return, climbing out with the gear down is not something that should ever be

done as a normal operation, and is negative training in developing a habit that will keep you out of trouble.

A potential hazard exists any time the gear is down in an amphib, and the most important survival instinct of a good amphib pilot is having a nagging, uneasy feeling any time the gear is extended. Intentionally leaving the gear down after any takeoff discourages the development of this feeling. If you suppress this uneasy feeling, or fail to develop it for the sake of expediency, it might not be there to serve you when you need it. Excessive gear cycles may cause wear in the short run, but it is part of fostering a habit and mentality that will serve you well in the long term.

I think it should be an integral part of every takeoff to quickly transition to a safe, gear-up configuration. If this becomes a habit that is never compromised, then any deviation from this normal routine will raise a red flag and perhaps someday prevent an accident.

Adequate fuel

Life vests & survival gear

Airport locations & alternate sites

Stormy? Socked in? Sit it out

Know your aircraft, your limits

Assume nothing

It's not a new system; it's an old one called INTUITION

Kieran K. O'Farrell
Regional Safety Program Manager

One of the most difficult aspects of my job is to review transcripts from fatal accidents. One of the most troubling things about these transcripts is that almost without exception, right before an accident there is great doubt or anxiety amongst the crew or the pilot talking to ATC. The last recorded phrases are often something like, "I don't like this..." "That jet cleared the runway...right?" "Press on to where though?" "Are you sure he said that?"... "God This is bad"... "I'm turning around" - "Not me, I'll see you on the other side"... Epitaph echoes. Phrases, prompted from an uneasy feeling. An uneasy feeling that perhaps if had been acted upon would have resulted in a different outcome.

While I realize that I run the risk of a discussing a very 'touchy, feely', subject here, (pilot's favorite kind), it is nonetheless something that we have all experienced at one time or another. We are all born with instincts, which remain a part of us throughout our lives. Animals are very driven by them. There are numerous stories about how strangely animal react right before a major disaster.



Strange Animal Behavior

Most recently, strange animal instinct behavior has been reported in the disastrous tsunami that rolled through the Indian Ocean killing over 200,000 people in a dozen countries. Maryann Mott from National Geographic News reported on January 4, 2005 that relatively few animals have been reported dead, however, reviving speculation that animals somehow sense impending disaster.

Corea, a Sri Lankan who immigrated to the United States 20 years ago, said two of his friends noticed unusual animal behavior before the tsunami. One friend, in the southern Sri Lankan town of Dickwella, recalls nocturnal bats frantically flying away just before the tsunami struck that morning. Another friend, who lives on the coast near Galle, said his two dogs would not go for their daily run on the beach. "They are usually excited to go on this outing," Corea said. But on this day they refused to go and most probably saved his life. About an hour before the tsunami hit, Corea said, people at Yala National Park observed three elephants running away from the Patanangala beach screaming.

What does all that mean to us in aviation, and how can we apply it to accident avoidance? As it turns out, perhaps a great deal.

What is intuition?

1. Webster's defines it as:
 - a. The act or faculty of knowing or sensing without the use of rational processes; immediate cognition.
 - b. Knowledge gained by the use of this faculty; a perceptive insight.
2. A sense of something not evident or deducible; an impression.

Intuition is that little voice that tells one, 'do proceed, or do not proceed with events'...or a sixth sense that some are familiar with. But what exactly is intuition? Intuition is a sense of insight or mental awareness. Having knowledge or some form of conviction by means of intuition can empower one to make more cautious decisions.

Having a sense of intuition can sometimes make or break a person's life -- literally. In some cases a sixth sense or ESP, intuition plays a vital role in decisive actions or inactions. Many veteran police officers will convey stories of miraculous intuition that have saved lives, even their own. A good example of intuition would be this: Have you ever began to drive down a road, enter a location, or simply walk through a park? Then suddenly, a peculiar feeling nudges you and you decide against it? That -- is intuition. Perhaps feelings aren't always the same, and maybe things may or may not happen by the uneasiness that one feels; but in most cases, intuition is almost always indicative of what one should or shouldn't do.

We experience it from time to time in flying. That 'gut feeling' does have a basis in medical science. Scientists tell us that a strong neural pathway runs directly from the brain to the stomach. When this happens it produces a feeling of nausea or impending doom, the one you get right before you start thinking, "I have a bad feeling about this". It is our bodies' ancient way of saying, "you

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talked yourself into thinking it must be alright, but it is not!"

Not surprisingly, it turns out that women, in this case, women pilots do have a higher level of intuition. According to Bob Baron, president of the Aviation Consulting group of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and a specialist in aviation human factors, "Females do have--- or at least regard and act on--- a higher level of intuition than males do." Perhaps that is why it is so often called "women's institution". Women are more likely to be cautious where they park a car in a mall, or more attuned to an odd sound in a house at night.

The most vivid case I can remember where intuition played a role in my life was a number of years ago when flying for a Part 135 company in Southeast Alaska. I took a routine local flight. The flight was scheduled to depart at 3:00 pm. I had been flying the same plane all day, the weather was good and nothing was out of the ordinary. As it got closer to 3:00, I got more and more uncomfortable. I walked out to the airplane, did another pre-flight (something I assure you was out of the norm for me) inquired about the passengers, weather and re-checked everything. Nothing was amiss, yet my feeling got progressively worse.

I loaded up the passengers and took an uneventful flight to the village. I laughed at myself (in a rather relieved sort of way) at being so superstitious, and headed back to Juneau empty. I cannot explain why I chose an altitude much higher than necessary to safely cross Chatham Straits, a decision I don't believe was even a conscious one. I had done everything in my power to disarm that nagging alarm that *something* was wrong, and was rather successful at it until the engine started 'surging violently'. (Granted any engine surging over open water in a single engine land plane sounds violent) I called the base and conveyed my predicament. I made no power changes until I was sure I had the runway made. I informed ATC as to what was happening and dove for the runway. The engine ceased completely once I had landed, just prior to the taxiway. It was not until several hours later that I shook physically when I re-lived the event, and days before the queen of denial had to face the fact that I tried to silence that 'bad feeling' I experienced, as surely as I had popped a circuit breaker to stop an irritating noise. To this day I do not know why I tried to dismiss that feeling. It has always

served me well, and has only been wrong when I have tried to out-think it.

Often it is during times of a loss of situational awareness, or a lack of certainty about an ATC direction, feeling task-saturated or fatigued, that we may experience a nagging, uneasy feeling of intuition. It is as if a survival chip is activated and it is imperative that we listen and react to that feeling.

Since the introduction of cockpit voice recorders, we have been able to hear a crew's last conversation before an accident. So often the investigators hear the chilling words that I call 'epitaph echoes'. In those conversations there is often anxiety, tension and confusion in the cockpit. There is an uneasy aura in the cockpit that as you read or listen to the transcripts, you can...profoundly feel.

The following is a transcript from the American Airlines Flight 965 Cali Accident report near Colombia, December 20, 1995

First Officer: "Left turn, so you want a left turn back around to ULQ?"

Captain: "Nawwww..hell no, lets press on to..."

First Officer: " well...we're...press on to where though?"

Captain: "Tulua"

First Officer: "That's right u u."

Captain: "Where we goin?" one, two...come to the right. Let's go to Cali first of all, lets we got [expletive] up here didn't we."

First Officer: "Yeah."

Captain: "Uh American uh, 38 miles north of Cali, and you want us to go Tula and then do the Rozo uh...to, uh, to runway 19?"

ATC: "...you can [unintelligible word] landed runway one niner, you can use runway one niner. What is (you) altitude and DME from Cali?"

First Officer: "OK, we're 37 DME at 10,000 feet."

ATC: "Roger report, uh, 5,000 and uh, final to one, one, runway one niner."

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Epitaph Echoes
"Resist the urge to ignore or disarm your internal warning system. It may be the first one you heard before your flight, and could be the last one you ever hear."

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Captain: 'it's that [expletive] Tuluva I'm not getting for some reason. See I can't get. OK now, no. Tuluva's [expletive] up.'

Captain: "but I can put it in the box if you want it."

First Officer: I don't want Tuluva. Let's just go to the centerline of uh..."

Captain: "which is Rozo."

Captain: 'Why don't you just go to Rozo then, alright?'

First Officer: "OK, let's..."

Captain: "I'm goin' to put that over you."

First Officer: "...get some altimeters, we'er out of uh, ten now."

ATC: Requested the flight's altitude.

Captain: "965, nine thousand feet."

ATC: Requested the distance.

Captain: "Roger, distance now?"

The Flight crew did not respond. The airplane's ground proximity warning system (GPWS) chimed, " terrain, terrain, whoop, whoop."

Captain: "Oh [expletive]...pull up baby."

The airplane struck mountainous terrain at the 8,900 foot level, killing 160 people out of 164 aboard.

There are so many similar cases, and after reading or listening to many transcripts, I am convinced that most of those pilots had a 'bad feeling' prior to the accident. If we take anything away from all of this, perhaps it will be a renewed awareness and an appreciation for that intuitive, ancient instinct, that we all possess to some degree, called intuition. And perhaps the next time you are flying and you experience an uneasy gut feeling, you will not disengage it, but listen carefully to what it is trying to warn you about, and respond immediately.

What has been said here is so aptly expressed by Commander Howard Bucknell in the June 1964 *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*:


"Play your hunches, Captain. No one else in the ship can develop such a composite "feel" for the ship as her captain . . . Many commanding officers have had cause to regret that they did not heed that small inner voice that their unique experience, non-watch keeping responsibility, and continuing information give them."

Southeast Alaska IA Renewal Seminars

The first in a series of two IA seminars were held at the Ketchikan Campus, Tuesday, March 15, 2005, the second was held in Juneau, Thursday, March 17, 2005.

Subjects and speakers were:

- Light Sport Aircraft: Dan Billman, Regional Airworthiness Specialist
- Weight and Balance for A&Ps: Larry West, Juneau FSDO
- Canadian STC Holders: Peter Pupator, Anchorage Aircraft Certification Office
- Capstone Equipment Maintenance: Dan Billman, Regional Specialist
- Field Approval of Alterations: Dan Billman, Peter Pupator
- Designated Engineering Representatives: Peter Pupator
- Maintenance Risk Management: Video Presentation



This yearly training session is not only to renew IA's, but also to share the rare camaraderie mechanics know and learn from each other. Lunch was provided at both locations and cooked by your friendly Juneau FSDO staff!

Some things to think about...



John Maxwell defines leadership as influence, nothing more, and nothing less. Think about that the next time you observe a pilot knowingly or unknowingly involved in an unsafe act. By exerting your influence, you will have played an important part in aviation safety.

Kieran O'Farrell, Regional Safety Program Manager

“Whenever we talk about a pilot who has been killed in a flying accident, we should all keep one thing in mind, that they made a judgment. They believed in it so strongly that they knowingly bet their lives and the lives of their passengers on it. That their judgment was faulty is a tragedy. Many of us here today had the opportunity to influence their judgment, so a little bit of us goes with everyone we lose.”

Author: unknown

“When anyone asks me how I can best describe my experiences of nearly forty years at sea, I merely say ‘uneventful’. I have never been in an accident of any sort worth speaking about...I never saw a wreck and have never been wrecked, nor was I ever in any predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort.”

Captain Edward J. Smith, R.M.S. Titanic, an experienced 62 year old captain; this was to be his last voyage prior to retirement, 1912



WHY I WANT TO BE A PILOT

When I grow up I want to be a pilot because it's a fun job and easy to do. That's why there are so many pilots flying around these days.

Pilots don't need much school. They just have to learn to read numbers so they can read their instruments.

I guess they should be able to read a road map, too.

Pilots should be brave so they won't get scared if it's foggy and they can't see, or if a wing or motor falls off.

Pilots have to have good eyes to see through the clouds, and they can't be afraid of thunder or lightning because they are much closer to them than we are.

The salary pilots make is another thing I like. They make more money than they know what to do with. This is because most people think that flying a plane is dangerous, except pilots don't because they know how easy it is.

I hope I don't get airsick because I get carsick and if I get airsick, I couldn't be a pilot and then I would have to go to work.

Purported to have been written by a fifth grade student at Jefferson School, Beaufort, SC.

It was first published in the South Carolina Aviation News



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Federal Aviation Administration
Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center
Almen Certification Branch, AFS-760
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COMPLACENCY

By: Les Hartley

Owner and Operator of Alsek Air Service in Yakutat, Alaska

Complacency, complacency! Where are you?
You're waiting, lurking in the shadows around the next bend.
I know you well, but you're not my friend.

I've seen you sneak up and worm your way in.
These eyes have seen you kill and maim again and again.

Oh yes, at times I have let you into my life.
You come sweet-talking and smiling,
'Hey! Don't bother with this, don't bother with that.'
Your ways are like the stalking of a jungle cat.

With you we must evade, struggle and fight,
for if we don't, you will take us by day or night.

We will continue to do battle and yes, some of us will lose,
But if we rally our forces, fight you off, die of old age, of which we would choose.

So complacency go, go back to the shadows, back to your evil pit.
We will be on guard and you can count on this.
We shall not quit.

